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Research Report

FOREIGN POLICY GUIDED BY ABSTRACT GENERALIZATIONS:

THE KOREAN WAR CASE

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
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FOREIGN POLICY GUIDED BY ABSTRACT GENERALIZATIONS:
THE KOREAN WAR CASE

by

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ABSTRACT

TITLE: Foreign Policy Guided by Abstract Generalizations:
The Korean War Case

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Foreign policy decision makers should avoid formulating objectives in abstract or generalized terms. Unfortunately, the generalization embodied in the policy of containment contributed directly to United States participation in the Korean War. In the most simplified terms the abstract generalization of containment meant that the United States must be ready to counter the expansionist moves of the Soviet-led communists everywhere around the globe. When North Korea attacked South Korea President Truman and Secretary of State Acheson automatically assumed it was a communist attack directed by Stalin. I believe that viewing events through the lens of containment distorted their perceptions and dictated automatic reactions. In my judgement the evidence indicates that the Korean War was actually a civil war fueled by the forces of nationalism working to overcome the arbitrary division of the country following World War II. The American response to the invasion, however, was consistent with the precepts of containment and demonstrates the hazards of using abstract generalizations to guide foreign policy. As a consequence of the Korean War the United States expended a great deal of treasure and blood for very little gain.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Commander William O. Shewchuk is an attack pilot in the United States Navy and a student of international affairs. He has deployed with carrier battle groups to many regions of the globe to implement American foreign policy and in doing so has developed an interest in the decision making process. He has served with various A-6 Intruder squadrons and on the staff of the Commander, Sixth Fleet. Commander Shewchuk received his Master's Degree in Political Science from Auburn University at Montgomery and is a graduate of the Air War College, class of 1992.

FOREIGN POLICY GUIDED BY ABSTRACT GENERALIZATIONS:
THE KOREAN WAR CASE

INTRODUCTION

The process of formulating foreign policy is fraught with hazards. One that occurs particularly with American leaders is the mistake of too rigidly using abstract generalizations to guide the development and implementation of foreign policy. Examples of abstract generalizations include American concepts of "fair play," "human rights," and "democracy." Abstract generalizations tend to drastically oversimplify reality and make it difficult to deal with complex problems. When foreign policy is described in abstract or generalized terms there is also the potential to make mistakes in evaluating international events and a tendency to react reflexively. It makes it difficult to think about the situation in a rational and intelligent manner that facilitates the consideration of multiple options and alternatives before adopting a course of action. Unfortunately, American foreign policy has often been guided by abstract generalizations.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze and assess the impact of abstract generalizations on American foreign policy and, specifically, how the generalization embodied in the policy of containment influenced United States participation in the

Korean War. The containment theory developed through an evolutionary process that was affected by American perceptions of international events and the domestic situation during the early years of the "cold war." Our relationship with South Korea developed in the context of the policy of containment and set the stage for U.S. involvement in the Korean War. The result of applying this abstract generalization to American foreign policy was a commitment to South Korea and subsequent dramatic implications for American foreign policy for several decades.

This paper will begin with a review of international and domestic events and relate them to the key documents produced during the evolution of the containment policy during the period 1945-1950. That background information will be followed by an examination of the containment policy of the United States with respect to Korea which eventually led to participation in the Korean War. America's foreign policy will then be evaluated in light of the abstract generalization which guided its formulation and implementation in order to determine the validity of the American response to North Korea's invasion of South Korea. Finally, mistakes in U.S. perceptions and judgement will be identified and related to the long term application of American foreign policy. By developing an awareness and understanding of the problems associated with abstract generalizations, it should be possible to avoid similar pitfalls when dealing in the complex American foreign policy process in the future.

EVOLUTION OF CONTAINMENT

The origins of the cold war and the policy of containment can be found in the relations between the Soviets and Americans immediately following World War II. The focus of conflict, initially was Stalin's insistence on a Soviet sphere of influence in eastern and central Europe. America viewed the Soviet stance as expansionist and threatening to western Europe. Stalin believed American policy toward eastern Europe was aimed at undermining Soviet security. Given the communist ideology and Stalin's sense of paranoia, it is not surprising that conflict and confrontation developed early in the postwar period.

On 22 February, 1946, George F. Kennan, then attache in the American Embassy in Moscow, sent to Washington his "long telegram" which spelled out what he thought were the underlying sources of Soviet behavior. Key points include:

At bottom of Kremlin's neurotic view of world affairs is traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity.

[The Russians] have learned to seek security only in patient but deadly struggle for total destruction of rival power, never in compacts or compromises with it.

Problem of how to deal with this force in [is] undoubtedly greatest task our diplomacy has ever faced and probably greatest it will ever have to face.

[Soviet Power] does not take unnecessary risks. Impervious to logic of reason, and it is highly sensitive to logic of force. For this reason it can easily withdraw--and usually does--when strong resistance is encountered at any point. Thus, if the adversary has sufficient force and makes clear his readiness to use it, he rarely has to do so.¹

Kennan's warning was well received and widely read in Washington. It came to serve as the intellectual justification for the policy of containment.

Former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill delivered a speech in Fulton, Missouri on 5 March, 1946, in which he described the descent of an "iron curtain" across much of Europe. In this famous speech Churchill warned Americans of the Soviet threat. He also referred to the Soviets as leaders of a monolithic communist empire. He said that all the cities and populations behind the iron curtain "are subject, in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and increasing measure of control from Moscow." Furthermore, "far from the Russian frontiers and throughout the world, Communist fifth columns [Communist parties] are established and work in complete unity and absolute obedience to the directions they receive from the Communist center."² Churchill also evaluated the Soviets in much the same way as Kennan: "From what I have seen of our Russian friends and allies during the war, I am convinced that there is nothing they admire so much as strength, and there is nothing for which they have less respect than for military weakness."³

Soviet activities in Iran and communist insurgencies in Turkey and Greece following World War II were also viewed as aggressive and provocative, particularly since they could not be justified as defensive measures as in eastern Europe. When the

British determined they could no longer provide aid to Greece and Turkey in early 1947, President Truman took up the cause. On March 12th, 1947, President Truman delivered a message to Congress which came to be known as the Truman Doctrine. Truman asked for immediate aid for Greece and Turkey and explained his reasoning by focusing on the threat of Communist expansionism:

I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.

I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way.

I believe our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes.⁴

The Truman Doctrine was an uncompromising statement of American intentions that would come to have a vast impact on American foreign policy.

The Marshall Plan was an economic application of the Truman Doctrine. It was developed in recognition of the need to provide economic assistance to war ravaged Europe in order to promote political stability. When Czechoslovakia fell under control of the Communist Party in February of 1948 the Marshall Plan (Economic Recovery Act), which had not yet been passed by the Congress, received tremendous support in America. The \$13-billion program rebuilt western Europe and helped integrate the region into an alliance against the Soviets.

In July 1947, George Kennan published an article in the journal Foreign Affairs entitled "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" and signed only "By X." Kennan expanded upon the Truman Doctrine in the article, which came to be the cornerstone of American foreign policy. He saw the threat from the Soviets as primarily a political and economic one that could be met by "long term, patient but firm and vigilant containment." According to Stephen Ambrose, however, the key sentence influencing American policy was the one requiring "the adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy."⁵ Many readers thought Kennan viewed the threat as military and the prescription to be a strong military ready to counter the Soviets every move.

Following the formation of the Western Union (Brussels Pact), which demonstrated Western Europe's concern and commitment, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in April of 1949. NATO was clearly a product of the cold war, especially the conflict over Germany and the blockade of Berlin which occurred in June of 1948. The essence of the treaty was a military alliance to counter the threat of Soviet aggression in Europe. In fulfillment of the guidance laid out by Kennan in his Foreign Affairs article, the United States, in conjunction with

its European allies, was determined to confront the Soviets from a position of strength and demonstrate its willingness to fight if necessary to contain communism.

Additional developments on the international scene seemed to support the policy of containment. The Soviets detonated their first atomic bomb in August of 1949. This event greatly alarmed many Americans. The idea that the relatively cheap atomic bomb alone be used to counter the massive Soviet army now was in question. Additionally, in October, 1949, the victory of Mao and the communists in China caused Americans to view with concern the general negative trend in foreign affairs which marked the early years of the cold war. Because of the belief that all Communists were aggressive and working together in a single bloc largely directed by Moscow, this was seen as a distinct increase in the threat.

Domestic events in 1950 also raised serious concerns in the United States and yielded increased support for the policy of containment. In January, Alger Hiss, a State Department official with impeccable credentials and a distinguished career of service to the country, was suspected of passing classified documents to the Soviets and was sentenced to five years in prison for perjury. The question on the minds of many Americans was, "If you can't trust Alger Hiss, who can you trust?" In February, Senator Joseph McCarthy gave a speech in Wheeling, West Virginia, in which he held up a piece of paper that he said contained the

names of 205 government employees who "were known to the Secretary of State as being members of the Communist Party and who, nevertheless, are still working and shaping the policy of the State Department."⁶ These two incidents ignited the "Red scare" that began to sweep across the country. It made sense to many Americans, for it provided an explanation of how the Soviets were able to achieve atomic bomb capability so quickly and why the State Department "lost China." The result of the international and domestic events during the five years since the end of World War II was a dramatic shift in the mood of Americans. At the end of the war they were full of optimism and confidence. On the eve of the Korean War, however, they had ominous feelings of doubt and anxiety concerning America's role in the world and the Soviet threat.

In reference to foreign policy in the Far East, Dean Acheson gave a speech at the National Press Club on 12 January, 1950, in which he discussed the defensive perimeter in Asia. He described a defensive perimeter analogous to that given by General MacArthur during an interview in March of 1949.⁷ Acheson gave the following description:

This defensive perimeter runs along the Aleutians to Japan and then goes on to the Ryukyus. We hold important defense positions in the Ryukyu Islands, and these we will continue to hold....The defensive perimeter runs from the Ryukyus to the Philippine Islands.

Acheson added two paragraphs concerning interests outside of the defense line:

So far as the military security of other areas in the Pacific is concerned, it must be clear that no person can guarantee these areas against military attack....

Should such an attack occur...the initial reliance must be on the people attacked to resist it and then upon the commitments of the entire civilized world under the Charter of the United Nations, which so far has not proved to be a weak reed to lean on by any people who are determined to protect their independence against outside aggression.

Acheson went on to say that "it is a mistake, I think, in considering Pacific and Far East problems to become obsessed with military considerations." Acheson thought that subversion was the greatest threat and "that cannot be stopped by military means...."⁸ He was convinced that economic aid would promote the stability and political order necessary to keep the communists at bay.

The culmination in the evolutionary process of containment theory prior to the Korean War was National Security Council Paper No. 68 (NSC-68). It was presented to President Truman in April, 1950. NSC-68 was the product of a comprehensive review of American policy. The paper depicted the world beset by Soviet expansionism that only the United States could halt. Some significant passages in the document include:

As for the policy of "containment," it is one which seeks by all means short of war to (1) block further expansion of Soviet power, (2) expose the falsities of Soviet pretensions, (3) induce a retraction of the Kremlin's control and influence and (4) in general, so foster the seeds of destruction within the Soviet system that the Kremlin is brought at least to the point of modifying its behavior to conform to generally accepted international standards.

It was and continues to be cardinal in this policy that we possess superior overall power in ourselves or in dependable combination with other like-minded nations. One

of the most important ingredients of power is military strength. In the concept of "containment," the maintenance of a strong military posture is deemed to be essential for two reasons: (1) as an ultimate guarantee of our national security and (2) as an indispensable backdrop to the conduct of the policy of "containment." Without superior aggregate military strength, in being and readily mobilizable, a policy of "containment"--which is in effect a policy of calculated and gradual coercion--is no more than an empty bluff.

It is quite clear from Soviet theory and practice that the Kremlin seeks to bring the free world under its domination by methods of the cold war....The Soviet Union is seeking to create overwhelming military force to back up infiltration with intimidation.

It is necessary to have the military power to deter, if possible, Soviet expansion, and to defeat, if necessary, aggressive Soviet or Soviet-directed actions of a limited or total character.⁹

NSC-68 was the logical conclusion of the containment theory in its evolutionary process. It called for an internationalist foreign policy in order to "contain" the Soviet system. The bottom line, however, is that meeting the Soviet threat would require a substantial military buildup--and that would be very expensive! Truman's initial response was to refer NSC-68 for further study, but once the Korean War broke out its recommendations gained great support.

The policy of containment was therefore developed incrementally over a five year period in response to the perceived communist threat. Among policy makers it was believed that, without a doubt, the Soviet led-communists were bent on world conquest. The theory provided a framework upon which to build a foreign policy with all of its military, economic, political and diplomatic attributes focused on containing

communist expansion. For the United States to be successful, according to the application of this abstract generalization, it must be firm in its dealings with the Soviet Union and build up its military arsenal to support the policy of containment.

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY REGARDING KOREA

America's relationship with Korea evolved in parallel with the containment policy in the five years following the end of World War II. Truman's view of Korea was guided by the report of Ambassador Edwin Pauley who toured the country in May and June of 1946. In a letter to the president Ambassador Pauley said:

Frankly, I am greatly concerned with our position in Korea and believe it is not receiving the attention and consideration it should. While Korea is a small country, and in terms of our total military strength is a small responsibility, it is an ideological battleground upon which our entire success in Asia may depend. It is here that a test will be made of whether a democratic competitive system can be adapted to meet the challenge of a defeated feudalism, or whether some other system, i.e. Communism will become stronger.

It is clear from the actions of the Soviets that they have no immediate intention of withdrawing from Korea....¹⁰

The Russians had occupied the northern part of the country following the surrender of the Japanese. Truman therefore sent troops to occupy Korea south of the 38th parallel. By 1947 there were some forty thousand American troops in Korea and an associated commitment to the country.

The commitment to South Korea inferred in the Truman Doctrine resulted in a great deal of debate between the State

Department and the newly organized National Military Establishment (which in 1949 was replaced by the Department of Defense). At a time when the military budget was very small the Department of Defense, complaining bitterly about the high cost of maintaining troops in Korea, developed a plan to withdraw from Korea. Truman agreed to the withdrawal of troops but linked it with continuing financial assistance for South Korea. U.S. combat troops left Korea in June of 1949 and after an initial defeat of the Korean aid bill Congress reversed itself and provided \$100 million for fiscal year 1951. The aid package was designed to demonstrate that the "withdrawal in no way indicates a lessening of United States interest in the Republic of Korea, but rather another step toward the normalization of that republic...."11

The U.S. Army hoped that the withdrawal of troops would end the country's military commitment to South Korea. Therefore, the Army prepared a detailed study outlining American options in the event of a North Korean attack on South Korea. The report also stressed that it would be "militarily undesirable and strategically unsound" to divert military aid to the ROK from areas with a higher priority. Furthermore, in contrast to the situation in Greece,

Korea is a liberated area which did not contribute to the victory and it is in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of little strategic value. To apply the Truman Doctrine to Korea would require prodigious effort and vast expenditure far out of proportion to the benefits to be expected.

The JCS emphasized that

any commitment to United States use of military force in Korea would be ill-advised and impractical in view of the potentialities of the overall world situation as compared with our current military strength.¹²

President Truman, however, received quite different advice from Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who pushed for a commitment to containment in Korea. In a report written by the State Department it was recognized that in the event of general hostilities "Korea would be a military liability." Nevertheless, "control of all Korea by Soviet or Soviet-dominated forces... would constitute a strategic threat to U.S. interests in the Far East." The State Department was firmly committed to applying the policy of containment to Korea:

It is important that there be no gaps or weakening in our policy of firmness in containing the U.S.S.R. because weakness in one area is invariably interpreted by the Soviets as indicative of an overall softening. A backing down or running away from the U.S.S.R. in Korea could very easily result in a stiffening of the Soviet attitude on Germany or some other area of much greater intrinsic importance to us. On the other hand, a firm "holding of the line" in Korea can materially strengthen our position in our dealings with the U.S.S.R.¹³

President Truman was strongly influenced by Acheson. In the period of five short years Korea shifted from an area of little significance to one of substantial interest to America. The principle reason for this shift was the application of broad generalizations, principally the policy of containment, to the foreign policy making process. The essential elements of the

policy indicated that the Soviets were committed to expansion, the Soviets were deterred only by strength, and it was a vital interest of the United States to contain communism. In the most simplified terms the abstract generalization of containment meant that the United States must be ready to counter the expansionist moves of the Soviets everywhere around the globe. As a result, Korea, as well as Europe, the Middle East and other places around the world became an area of confrontation between the two superpowers.

Gaining support for Truman's foreign policy aimed at containing the Soviets was no easy task. America had a long tradition, beginning with Washington's Farewell Address, that tended to avoid internationalist policies, especially ones that promised to be so expensive. Truman used a two pronged approach to build support for containment. First, he described the situation in the simplest of terms: good versus evil, Americanism versus communism. Second, he exaggerated the threat. Truman believed the threat was real and serious, but he needed dramatic effect to gain the support of the public and the Congress.* On the eve of the Korean War, Truman was convinced that international and domestic events supported the State Department assessment that the Soviets must be contained.

* Edward W. Barrett, the Asst Secretary of State for Public

Affairs, described the administration's plan to present the issues in dramatic and exaggerated terms as a "scare campaign."¹⁴

KOREAN WAR

The true origins of the Korean War and the actual role played by the Soviet Union is still the subject of considerable controversy and debate. As viewed by Truman and Acheson though, the invasion of South Korea on 25 June, 1950, was a test of American resolve. They believed the attack was Soviet directed and assumed that North Korea was under complete Soviet domination. Given the events that had occurred since 1945 and their perceptions which shaped the policy of containment, it is easy to understand how Truman and Acheson reached the conclusions that they did. However, because they applied abstract generalizations to the foreign policy decision making process, they limited their ability to consider alternative explanations.

It is my contention that the Soviets did not direct the North Korean attack and, furthermore, that the war should not be viewed in the context of an East-West conflict. Evidence available to the Truman administration showed that the Soviets actually did very little to support the North Koreans. They maintained their boycott from the United Nations Security Council, were slow to turn up their propaganda machinery, and even decreased arms shipments. Additionally, there was no direct involvement of Soviet military units. Finally, Andrei Gromyko met with the British Ambassador in Moscow just ten days after the

war began and told him that "the USSR wished for a peaceful settlement of the Korean dispute."¹⁵ These actions indicate a lack of Soviet support for the North Koreans and cast considerable doubt on the theory that the Korean War was directed by the Soviets.

Still, one might ask how much the Soviets had to gain from a North Korean victory whether they supported it or not. A victory by the North would have resulted in a severe blow to the prestige and credibility of the United States. Even a prolonged stalemate would drain American resources and severely strain worldwide commitments. While these arguments are reasonable, they still do not point toward collusion between Moscow and P'yongyang to attack South Korea.

There is, however, yet another explanation for the origins of the Korean War. In my judgement, the Korean War was actually a civil war. Both North and South Korea were obsessed with ending the partition of the country forced upon them following World War II. The partition did not recognize the homogeneous society with a single language, national heritage, and political culture that had existed for centuries. Kim Il-sung apparently assessed the situation in South Korea and decided that economic conditions were improving and guerrilla activities were having limited effect. So, while the North enjoyed a favorable military advantage, Kim Il-sung decided to act.

Regardless of the true origins of the war, the American response to the invasion was consistent with the precepts of the policy of containment. Secretary of State Acheson recalls in his memoirs:

It seemed close to certain that the attack had been mounted, supplied, and instigated by the Soviet Union and that it would not be stopped by anything short of force. If Korean force proved unequal to the job, as seemed probable, only American military intervention could do it.

...it was an open, undisguised challenge to our internationally accepted position as the protector of South Korea, an area of great importance to the security of American-occupied Japan. To back away from this challenge, in view of our capacity for meeting it, would be highly destructive of the power and prestige of the United States.¹⁶

Truman also received similar advice from John Foster Dulles:

It is possible that South Koreans may themselves contain and repulse attack, and, if so, this is the best way. If, however, it appears that they cannot do so then we believe that US force should be used even though this risks Russian countermoves. To sit by while Korea is overrun by unprovoked armed attack would start disastrous chain of events leading most probably to world war.¹⁷

Truman took the advice of these counselors and commented:

Korea is the Greece of the Far East. If we are tough enough now, if we stand up to them like [sic] we did in Greece three years ago, they won't take any steps. But if we just stand by, they'll move into Iran and they'll take over the whole Middle East. There's no telling what they'll do if we don't put up a fight now.¹⁸

If history has taught us anything, it is that aggression anywhere in the world is a threat to peace everywhere in the world. When that aggression is supported by the cruel and selfish rulers of a powerful nation who are bent on conquest, it becomes a clear and present danger to the security and independence of every free nation.¹⁹

It is clear from these comments that America's leadership

felt compelled to take action in Korea to contain communism. They believed that failure to do so would severely damage America's prestige and adversely affect the credibility of America's commitment to support friends and allies around the world. The Truman administration was also sensitive to attacks from domestic critics that it was soft on communism. Americans were genuinely concerned about the threat of communism both at home and abroad. It was for these reasons that Truman made the decision to commit American forces to the containment of communism in Korea.

The role of Dean Acheson as the architect of containment and principle counselor to President Truman cannot be overstated. He provided the advice and dominated the discussions which guided Truman's decision to intervene in Korea. For Acheson, the Korean War provided the necessary impetus to support and fund NSC-68. As he remarked in his memoirs: Korea "came along and saved us... it is doubtful whether anything like what happened in the next few years could have been done had not the Russians been stupid enough to have instigated the attack against Korea...."²⁰ But Acheson, like others, got caught in the trap of using abstract generalizations to guide foreign policy. He was unable to rationally analyze the origins and nature of the Korean War or the role of the Soviets.

RAMIFICATIONS OF THE CONTAINMENT POLICY

The consequences of implementing the containment policy following the outbreak of the Korean War included: approval of NSC-68 and subsequent increase in the FY 1951 defense budget from \$13.5 billion to \$48.2 billion; transformation of NATO into an integral military structure; rearming of West Germany; increased aid for French forces in Indochina; and neutralization of the Taiwan Strait by the Seventh Fleet. In particular, this last action probably contributed to the Chinese decision to intervene in the Korean War following General MacArthur's crossing of the 38th parallel. Furthermore, any hope of driving a wedge between Moscow and Peiking evaporated as long as containment was directed at monolithic communism.

CONCLUSION

As discussed earlier, there are alternative explanations concerning the nature of the Korean War. I believe the evidence supports my contention that it was a civil war whose origins lay in the arbitrary division of the country following World War II and the forces of nationalism which sought to correct that situation. In my judgement, Truman and Acheson were guided by an abstract generalization that dictated automatic reactions. Their perceptions were distorted because they viewed world events through the lens of the containment policy. Therefore, when North Korea attacked South Korea, they automatically assumed it

was a communist attack directed by Stalin. Unfortunately, this assumption also limited possible responses to the invasion. Perhaps if they had evaluated the situation unencumbered by this abstract generalization Truman and Acheson might have considered responses in the context of national interests other than the ones they perceived. It is even possible that as a result of the Korean War there could have been the first steps towards a reduction in Cold War tensions. Speculating "what if" is, of course, risky business. The point is that Truman and Acheson did not consider alternatives and consequences or pursue other options when confronted with the crisis in Korea because their judgement was significantly affected by the policy of containment. In short, wearing the blinders of containment severely restricted the vision of America's leadership.

The United States expended a great deal of blood and treasure in Korea for little gain. The application of the containment policy to Korea demonstrates the hazards of using abstract generalizations to guide foreign policy decisions. Due to strict adherence to the policy of containment the leadership of the United States limited its foreign policy options. No longer did they choose the time and place in which to respond to acts of aggression. In addition to this loss of initiative, it is evident that there was a disconnect between ends and means. The expense of implementing containment in Korea as well as NSC-68 was tremendous. The return on that investment was of

questionable value. It can only be hoped that an increased awareness of the hazards of applying abstract generalizations to foreign policy will assist current and future decision makers from repeating the errors evidenced in United States involvement in the Korean War.

NOTES

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2. Ibid., p. 301.
3. Ibid., p. 302.
4. Ibid., p. 309.
5. Stephen E. Ambrose, Rise to Globalism, (New York: Penguin Books, 1985), p. 100.
6. Henry T. Nash, American Foreign Policy, (Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1985), p. 58.
7. Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation, (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1969), p. 357.
8. Paterson, p. 424.
9. Ibid., pp. 311-314.
10. Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1956), p. 321.
11. James Irving Matray, The Reluctant Crusade, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985), pp. 197-198.
12. Ibid., pp. 196-197.
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14. John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 107-8.
15. Cummings, p. 644.
16. Acheson, p. 405.
17. Ibid., p. 407.
18. Paterson, p. 450.
19. Ibid., p. 435.
20. Acheson, p. 374.

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